Kurgan ignores Canons 2201-2205.

"This one's a heretic"

"That one's a freemason!"

"This one's a real catholic"

"That one's not a catholic!"

If you say these statements, you are presuming to have information and insight that it is impossible for you to have. 

6 - Kurgan ignores Canons 2201-2205, which state the conditions necessary to incur any penalty.

Per 1917 Canon Law, what is necessary for a person to be guilty of ANY penalty? We find that in Canons 2201 - 2205:

To incur ANY penalty (per canons 2201-2205)

1 - One must not lack in the use to reason (can. 2201 par 1)

2 - One must not be habitually out of their minds (can. 2201 par 2 )

3 - One must not be voluntarily or involuntarily drunk, or have similar mental perturbations (can. 2201 par 3)

4 - One must have no mental debility (can. 2201 par 4)

5 - One must not be ignorant of the law (can. 2202 par 1)

6 - One must not be ignorant of the penalty (can. 2202 par 2)

7 - One must not be inadvertent (negligent), or be in error (can. 2202 par 3)

8 - One must have the proper diligence (can. 2203 par 1)

9 - One cannot have physical compulsion applied that forces one to act against one’s will (can. 2205 par 1)

10 - One must not be under grave fear (can. 2205 par 3)

So, one must satisfy all of these requirements in order to be found guilty of ANY crime whatsoever. As the commentary that follows implies, cases are handed on an individual basis (EVERYONE gets their day in court). This is also established by other canons. Even though some penalties are automatic (happen at the time of the offence), the Church still declares this in an official proceeding (but that topic is for another post).

For kurgan to just determine that a large group of people (clergy) are guilty of a crime, without a trial, is wrong, and a sin against justice. This is why we cannot judge anyone as guilty of anything. The only soul that we know (internal forum) is OUR OWN. The canons and commentaries follow below if you want to read further:

In kurgans eyes, all clergy and “heretics” are equally guilty, and all get the maximum penalty, automatically without a trial or ability to defend themselves. Canon law (and justice, charity, and love) are the opposite of this. 

Canon 2201

1 - Those who actually lack the use of reason are incapable of a delict.

2 - Those who are habitually out of their minds, even though they sometimes have lucid intervals, [and despite the fact that] at the time [in question] they seemed to be acting with a certain rationality, are nevertheless presumed incapable of a delict.

3 - A delict committed in voluntary drunkenness does not remove imputability, but it is less than the same delict committed with full use of the mind, unless, however, the drunkenness was sought to commit or excuse the delict; but a violation of the law during involuntary drunkenness excludes imputability completely if the drunkenness deprived one of the use of reason completely; it diminishes it if it was only in part. The same is said for other similar mental perturbations.

4 - Mental debility diminishes imputability of a delict, but does not remove it entirely.

Commentary - Woywod

     Incapable of committing an offense are those who do not enjoy the use of reason. 

     Habitually insane persons, though they have at times lucid moments, or seem to be sane in certain ways of reasoning and acting, are nevertheless presumed incapable of an offense.

     An offense committed in voluntary drunkenness is somewhat responsible, but in a lesser degree than if the same offense is committed by a person fully in control of his senses, unless drunkenness was sought deliberately for the purpose of committing the crime, or to excuse it. If the law has been violated in involuntary drunkenness, there is no responsibility at all if the intoxication deprived the person altogether of the use of reason; responsibility is diminished if the use of reason was only partially impaired. The same is to be said of other, similar disturbances of the mind.

     Debility of mind diminishes the responsibility of an offense but does not take it away altogether (Canon 2201)

Canon 2202

1 - Violation of a law in ignorance is imputed to no one, if the ignorance was not culpable; otherwise it is imputable more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance.

2 - Ignorance only of the penalty does not toll the imputability of the delict, but decreases it in part.

3 - Whatever is established for ignorance applies also to inadvertence and error.

Commentary 2201 and 2202 - Dom Augustine

     The degree of imputabiity is in proportion to the degree of dolus and culpa. Dolus or intention supposes a normal condition of the reasoning faculties, which in turn depends on organic conditions, which may be either actual or habitual, i. e., more or less permanent. Besides, even in a normal condition ignorance may play a part in forming an imputable judgment. Can. 2201 treats of abnormal organic conditions, whilst can. 2202 has ignorance in view.

1 - Incapable of committing a crime are those who are actually deprived or destitute of the use of reason. Hence acts committed in sleep or in a frenzied or furious state of mind cannot be imputed. The text also includes insanity.

2 - Those habitually insane are presumed to be incapable of committing a crime, even though they may have lucid moments or may appear sane as to certain processes of reasoning or certain acts. Insanity is a disturbance of the mental faculties and, as such, influences the legal aspect of crime. Modern criminologists attribute insanity to pathological conditions and speak of the epileptic, the neurasthenic, and the psychopathic states. Moral insanity, so-called, “in which all the upright sentiments are eliminated, while the intelligence presents no disorders,” is inadmissible and de facto rejected in American and English law. There are, on the other hand, different degrees of mental unsoundness, but “the very difficult practical question as to where the line of demarcation should be drawn” is yet unsolved. Two classes of mentally unsound persons are: (a) lunatics over whom the threats and prohibitions of the criminal law exercise no control; and (b) those whose insanity is so slight that they would not yield to it if a policeman were at their elbow. This rather technical distinction has been accepted by jurists ever since the case of Daniel McNaughten, A. D. 1843. We quote the replies given by the judges, because they not only are the norm of modern criminal law, but are also, to some extent, in accord with our Code.

(I) Every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient use of reason to be responsible for his crime, until the contrary has been proved to the satisfaction of a jury.

(II) To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly shown that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was performing, or if he did know, not to know that what he was doing was wrong.

(III) As to his knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, the judges say: “If the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if the act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable.” Thus the test is the power of distinguishing between right and wrong, not, as was once supposed, in the abstract, but in regard to the particular act committed.

(IV) When a criminal act is committed by a man under some insane delusion as to the surrounding facts, which conceals from him the true nature of the act he is doing, he will be under the same degree of responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists, had been as he imagined them to be.

     We say, these principles agree with the new Code to some extent, because on account of the rules governing imputability these rules may be accepted in globo. However, the Code is very liberal in presuming immunity from criminal intent or responsibility, even for lesser or intermittent insanity. But this is only a praesumptio iuris and not a praesumptio iuris et de iure (see can. 1825-1828). Hence the burden of proof is thrown upon the defendant, i. e., the one accused of crime. The proof of insanity is furnished by the preponderance of evidence. Experts are to be called in and the rules laid down under can 1762-1805 applied. 

     All the persons mentioned in can. 2201 par. 2 are to be treated as habitually insane, which, of course, presupposes a morbid disease and not merely an irrational impulse. However, such an impulse, which sometimes takes on the nature of an irresistible force, may only be the symptom of a latent though not violent habitual madness, and in that case it must be treated like habitual insanity, although courts of some states of our country and England exclude it as a plea of defense.

     One form of insane impulse is kleptomania, because the impulse to steal really seems to arise from actual insanity.

     With regard to hypnotism note that it has not yet become a subject of sufficient judicial consideration to justify the attempt to formulate any rules for it, and hence it must be treated like intoxication and passion, which are to be considered as to their antecedent causes and the intent.

3 - Intoxication or drunkenness, if deliberate, does not entirely take away responsibility for a crime committed in that state, although it diminishes imputability, thus rendering the crime less offensive than when committed in the state of complete responsibility, unless indeed the state of intoxication was brought about purposely in order to commit ot excuse the crime. Responsibility is to be fixed according to the degree of drunkenness, because it is this that determines the measure of voluntariness. But to excuse entirely a deed done in the state of voluntary intoxication would be to excuse one wrongful act by another, which neither the ecclesiastical nor the civil law can permit. For no one is allowed to put himself into a state of irresponsibility or to deprive himself of the use of reason without adequate cause. There is no difference between intoxication produced by alcoholic liquor and the state superinduced by certain drugs, such as opium, morphine, and cocaine. Even blamable drunkenness may sometimes have the effect of diminishing criminal responsibility. Thus it may easily cause a mistake in regard to facts which in itself excuse an otherwise unlawful act. Take for instance, a percussor clericorum, who in a drunken condition is not aware of the clerical character of his victim. Besides, intoxication may also lessen the guilty intent necessary for a particular crime. Thus murder in the first degree may be reduced to homicide. An exception is intentional drunkenness brought about for the purpose of committing a crime. But this supposes that the criminal had the wicked act in mind before getting drunk. Thus a pregnant woman who drank immoderately to brace herself for committing abortion would have no defense or excuse; on the contrary she would commit two distinct crimes.

     The next clause of par. 3 can 2201 mentions involuntary intoxication. This, if it takes away the use of reason, also takes away the responsibility, and diminishes imputability in proportion to the diminished use of reason. Biblical examples are well known (Noah and Lot). Such a state may be caused by malicious companions or by the administration of alcohol for medical purposes, or by exceptional susceptiblilty to stimulants. It will be no defense, however for a person to say that he did not intend to get drunk, although the fact may lessen his imputability in the court of conscience. The degree of responsibility is gauged by the control one has over his reasoning faculties.

The text adds: “Idem dicatur de aliissimilibus mentis perturbationibus.” These “other similar disturbances of the mind” may be caused by extraordinarily strong emotions of the irascible power. Thus the loss of dear ones may cause a sudden excitement, external, external natural causes such as fires, earthquakes, shipwrecks, etc., are apt to create a panic, and so forth. Hither also belong spiritistic and hypnotic suggestions and evocations which tend to upset the nerves.

4 - Finally the Code says the imbecility of mind lessens, though it does not take away, responsibility. Among imbeciles are reckoned the minus habentes, the half-stupid and, we believe, also such as are physically very weak, because there can be no doubt that great feebleness of the body also affects the mind, no matter of what age the person may be. Concerning age consult can. 2204.

     Canon 2202 has in view ignorance, which is not nescience, or absence of all knowledge, but properly means an absence of knowledge that is morally imputable to the free agent. Such ignorance may be culpable or inculpable, and hence our text says

1 - That inculpable ignorance of the law renders one immune from responsibility for transgressing it, while culpable ignorance diminishes the degree of imputability only in proportion to the obligation one is under of acquiring the necessary knowledge. Here the distinction between vincible and invincible ignorance is properly employed, whereas the distinction between antecedent and consequent ignorance has little or nothing to do with our text, as all agree that antecedent ignorance is not imputable. Thus if a clergyman goes hunting, he may be reasonably ignorant that hunting is forbidden, because really only the chase in the proper sense is forbidden, not simple hunting. He may also be ignorant about the game laws, and become aware of the unlawfulness of hunting only after a fine has been imposed.

     Ignorance is vincible if it can be removed by the use of ordinary means proportionate to the matter and the person who has to employ these means. If it cannot be remedied except by extraordinary means which are required neither by the thing itself nor by the state or vocation of the person who is supposed to be obliged to use such means, ignorance is called invincible.

     There are different degrees of vincible ignorance: affected, when one purposely avoids knowing the laws, so as to escape the burden of observing them; supine or crass, when one is ignorant of the law through indolence or carelessness. Both affected and supine ignorance, being consequent, render a crime simply involuntary.

     2 - Ignorance of the penalty does not take away imputability, but to some extent diminishes it. The reason is that penalty indeed deters from committing a crime too readily, but the mens rea, the remorse of conscience, is there and convicts the perpetrator of sin. However, since the penalty is, as a rule, proportionate to the gravity of the crime, it is but natural that ignorance of the penalty should diminish responsibility. What kind of ignorance is here intended is not explicitly stated. But since the term is used generally, it appears to include both vincible and invincible ignorance, as far as responsibility  is concerned, though not as far as incurring the penalty is implied.
 3 - What has been stated with regard to ignorance, must also be applied to inadvertence and error. Hence if one is not sure that a certain occupation or action may cause harm, he is supposed to be innocent of guilt. The same is true concerning error, for instance, if one is mistaken about the law prohibiting intercourse with excommunicati vitandi, he does not incur the penalty of excommunication. Note, however, that error and inadvertence as well as ignorance excuse from criminal responsibility in a higher or lesser degree according to the wording of the law. For laws which have the clause: scienter praesumpserit, ausus fuerit, require a higher degree of knowledge and attention, and on the other hand excuse more easily from criminal intent. This is a decidedly superior concept of law and responsibility than we find in secular codes. For, according to civil criminologists, a mistake in regard to the law, even though it be inevitable, does not afford an excuse for crime. This is quite intelligible, for the State has in view chiefly the public order.

Commentary 2202 - Woywod

     The violation of a law of which one was ignorant is not put ot one’s account if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise the responsibility is more or less diminished in proportion to the amount of the sinfulness of the ignorance.

     Ignorance of the penalty only attached to the violation of a law does not take away the responsibility for the offense, but diminishes it somewhat.

     What is said of ignorance holds good also in reference to inadvertence and error. (canon 2202) (Cf. Canon 2229)

Canon 2203

1 - If someone violates a law through the omission of due diligence, imputability is diminished in a manner to be determined by the prudence of the judge under the circumstances; but if he could forsee the matter, and nevertheless failed to take the precautions for it’s avoidance that a diligent person would have taken, fault is approximate to dolus.

2 - Fortuitous cause that cannot be foreseen, or that [seen, still] cannot be prevented from occurring, leaves off any sort of imputability.

Commentary Dom Augustine- Carelessness

     Carelessness, although it may approach dolus, is, according to Can. 2199, rather to be referred to culpa or lack of attention. But since many circumstances which puzzle the judge may surround the agent as well as the criminal act, he is to decide according to the common or ordinary circumstances. But if carelessness amounts, as it were, to forethought, it is more culpable. The text therefore says, a breach of law committed by omitting the required dililgence is less imputable, but the degree of imputability is left to be fixed by the judge, who must weigh all the circumstances. The judge, therefore, is not to set up the law, but to consider whether the act is punishable by law, i. e., whether a law exist that would punish such an act, at least in general.

     Diligence is taken here as a contrary of negligence; and therefore omission of it spells negligence, or carelessness, or thoughtlessness, etc. All these terms clearly refer to the intectual (either speculative or practical) attitude of man with regard to a determined law, e. g., the prohibition of homicide. If the term “debita,” is added to diligence, this cannot mean all possible diligence or attention, for to use such is not in the power of man; nor is it the intention of the lawgiver, else we should have to recur to the Sovereign Pontiff in each individual case. Diligence therefore must be gauged by the object itself, ex rei gravitate. For greater diligence is required in important cases than in cases of a less serious nature. Besides, diligence must be applied in proportion to the position or condition of the agent or person, ex qualitate personae. For persons in a responsible position, like prelates, physicians, and lawyers, are justly supposed to employ more attention, and to consider more carefully than ordinary human beings the circumstances and consequences of an action they are about to perform. The general rule is that a man shall omit nothing of his own accord that he can and must do in order to dispel ignorance. Hence it must be in his power and he must be under obligation to dispel noxious ignorance. For instance, canon 1269 states the rules for preserving the Holy Eucharist. Now if a priest to whose care the Blessed Sacrament is committed, would leave the place without taking proper precautions, he would be responsible if a sacrilege were committed through his negligence, and his responsibility would be as great as his thoughtlessness had been.

     But, continues can. 2203, if a person has been able to foresee the event (or effect of an action) and has nevertheless omitted to take the precautions which ordinary diligence would have dictated, carelessness approaches vicious intent or dolus. Thus a clergyman may not be guilty of voluntary if he throws a stone and kills someone, but if he goes hunting and omits the necessary precautions, he cannot be declared free of guilt in case a stray bullet from his gun kills or injures someone. Similarly, a clergyman exercising surgery (which he should not do) and omitting the necessary precautions or neglecting to acquire the necessary skill, cannot be declared guiltless.

     The next case considered by the Code is a casual one, or, as we call it, an accident, something that is not foreseen or, if foreseen, could not be avoided. Such an accident cannot be imputed. For instance, if a woman who has made her escape from her abductor jumps into a river and drowns, she is not considered a suicide who must be deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Thus also a homicide committed in self-defense against an unjust aggressor who could not otherwise be repelled, would not render one liable to excommunication; nor would a woman who suffered abortion by an unlucky fall be subject to the penalty for that crime (see canon 2350). How far carelessness may enter here must be judged according to what was said above on diligence. But the power and obligation there mentioned are a sure indication of the measure of diligence to be used. A fortuitous case, however, presupposes that it could not be foreseen or, at least, that it was unlikely to happen.

Commentary 2203 - Woywod

     If a person violates a law by omission of due diligence, the responsibility is diminished in a degree to be measured by the good judgment of the ecclesiastical judge according to th circumstances of the case. If the offender foresaw the occurrence and nevertheless neglected to use such precautions as any prudent man would have used, the guilt is next to willful violation of the law.

     As accidental case which could not be forseen or, if foreseen, could not be avoided, is free from all responsibility. (Canon 2203)

Canon 2204

Minor age, unless otherwise established, reduces imputability for a delict as one approaches closer to childhood.

Commentary - Dom Augustine

     Here only imputability is considered, for the diverse penalties are stated in can. 2230. Unless the contrary is evident, youth responsibility in proportion to its closeness to infancy. The Roman law regarded impuberes as entirely incapable of dolus. Canon Law, and the Decretals particularly, do not exclude responsibility, but admit that it may be lessened, more especially with regard to the sixth commandment. The Church is also very indulgent to minors (i. e., those who have not yet completed the twentieth year of age) when the right of immunity, or rather the ius asyli is concerned. 

     Thus Clement XIII vindicated this right to minors even in the case or homicide; because, he said, full malice cannot be attributed to youths and atrocious crimes are committed by them rarely. This may have been true at the time, but newspaper reports now-a-days tell a sad story of youthful depravity. Therefore our Code adds: nisi aliud constet, i. e., if malice does not supply the lack of age. Juvenile courts have been established of late years for youthful offenders and they deal with them more leniently that the courts were wont to do, not only at the time of Clement XIII, but also up to a comparatively recent date.

Canon 2205

1 - Physical force that prevents all faculty of action entirely excludes a delict.

2 - Additionally, grave fear, even if it is only relative, necessity, and even grave inconvenience for the most part thoroughly toll a delict, if it concerned a merely ecclesiastical law.

3 - But if the act was intrinsically evil or verged on contempt for the faith or ecclesiastical authority or harm to souls, the causes that [were outlined] in par. 2 indeed diminish imputability according to the cause of the provocation.

4 - [Force} for the sake of  legitimate protection against unjust aggression, if due moderation is observed, eliminates a delict completely; otherwise it only diminishes imputability according to the cause of the provocation.

Commentary by Dom Augustine - Violence, Fear, Necessity, Detriment

Violence, which takes away all freedom of action, excludes responsibility and consequently the guilt of a crime.

     Violence means external physical compulsion applied to force one to act against one’s own will as when a young man is haled before the ordaining bishop by his foolish parents. The doctrine of St. Thomas is very clear on this subject. The act of the will is twofold: one is it immediate act, a it were, elicited by it, namely to wish; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as to walk and to speak, which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power. As regards the commanded acts of the will, the actus imperati, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will’s command. But as to the will’s own proper act, the actus elicitus, violence cannot be done to the will. The reason is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge. On the other hand violence or compulsion proceeds from an exterior principle or agent. It is contrary to the nature of the will that it should be subject to compulsion or violence, just as it is contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or movement to be bent in a contrary direction. Violence, therefore, is directly opposed to the voluntary as well as the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things of knowledge violence effects something against nature (e. g., a stone thrown upwards); so in things endowed with knowledge it effects something against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be unnatural; and in like manner that which is against the will is said to be involuntary. Therefore violence cause involuntariness, and consequently an act done under such external influence is no human act, because a human act is always a voluntary act. Violence, in other words, renders an act irresponsible. However, note well, violence must be complete and adequate and referable to the act in question; in other words, there must be a causal connection between the violent act and the act commanded or intended by violence, as stated expressly in canon 1087 (concerning marriage). See also can. 214 concerning ordination under compulsion, the impediment of abduction (can. 1074), and acts against faith commanded by idolatrous or heretical parents who may be wicked and powerful enough to compel their children to come with them into non-Catholic temples, etc.

Par. 2 - Fear, even though relatively grave, necessity, and even a serious loss or detriment, if merely ecclesiastical laws are violated, often take away responsibility and therefore the guilt of crime.

1. a.Fear, or trepidation mentis ob malum imminens, has been sufficiently explained elsewhere. Since fear does not render a human act purely involuntary, but leaves it substantially free, it is evident that an act done from fear is imputable. Wherefore we need not be surprised that “duress per minas” forms a very rare defence in English-American law.
2. b.The same is true of necessity, which is a moral-physical state of man that prompts him to violate the law. Necessity has it degrees which depend on the helplessness of the person that is in need, and on the necessity of having or obtaining what I needed. Therefore extreme, grave and light necessity are distinguished. Extreme would be necessity which would concern life or death, material or spiritual. Grave is the necessity which would cause a serious spiritual or material loss of property, name, honor, social condition. Light is the necessity if the loss threatened is of little importance, or if the damage, though great, can easily be warded off or repaired. The Code is very generous, as far as the external forum is concerned, in admitting any kind of necessity, which, as Gratian says, knows no law.
3. c.Incommodum means inconvenience, trouble, bother, loss, detriment, and is related to necessity, with this difference, that necessity signifies rather a negative condition, or want, whereas incommodum may involve the positive deprivation of something that is convenient, or becoming, to one’s state or life. However, the inconvenience must be great. Incommodum is a very elastic term, an may be referred to the person affected as well as to the object that causes convenience or inconvenience.
4. d.Grave fear, necessity, and grave inconvenience excuse from crime only if the violation concerns an ecclesiastical law. For it is generally understood that merely positive laws do not oblige under great inconvenience, inasmuch as the human legislator is supposed not to wish to lay a too heavy burden upon man under such conditions. Thus the law of alienation without papal indult (can. 1532, 2347, n. 3) may really prove too burdensome, nay even detrimental, and therefore does not oblige under certain conditions. 

Par 3 - On the other hand, Par. 3 of can. 2205 states that an intrinsically evil act or an cat which implies contempt of faith or ecclesiastical authority or injury to souls may be excused on the grounds of grave fear, necessity, and grave inconvenience, but can never be declared entirely immune from criminal imputability,

1. a.Ethics teaches that the morality of an act arises from the object, the circumstances, and the end intended by the agent. These determinants make an act either good or bad; and since the moral quality is something objective, the act itself is objectively tainted by the defect of the intrinsic quality of the object, the circumstances, or the end. Of course, the intention can be rectified, provided the object and circumstances are either good or indifferent. However, this rather belongs to the internal forum.
2. b.To the external forum may be referred three kinds of acts here specified, namely, contempt of faith, contempt of ecclesiastical authority, and spiritual damage. Contempt of faith spells apostasy or heresy, contempt of authority implies schism, if not also heresy, and spiritual damage may be summed up under the heading of cooperation, scandal, and hatred. The synod of Ancyra (314 A.D.) issued three canons concerning the reception of the lapsi, i. e., those fallen in the persecution, to whom clemency is shown, but who are nevertheless censured for the crime they had committed against the faith. Of course, the compulsory offering of incense to pagan idols was free of guilt, but whether the act was done under compulsion could be proved only by the fact that the priests and deacons suffered torments or confiscation and protested their faith. Spiritual damage would be perjury, which is not allowed under any circumstances.

Par. 4 - The motive of legitimate self-defence against an unjust aggressor, provided the measure of necessity is not exceeded, takes away the criminal offence, and, like provacation, diminishes imputability. The reason for the clause is that a man may rightfully prefer his own life to that of an unjust assailant, who certainly and actually intends his death, when one or the other must die or will surely be killed. For the unjust assailant forfeits the right of his own life by intending to kill another.

     The so-called moderamen inculpatae tutelae requires: (a) that no more force is used than necessary to ward off the attack; (b) that the assailant is hic et nunc in the act of aggression; 9c) that no other means of escape are at hand, and (d) that the intention is (at least implicitly) directed not to the killing, but to the defence.

     Whether this plea of self-defence may also be made in cases where one’s honor, liberty, or fortune are at stake, is not explicitly stated in our text. However, it is certain that no one would be allowed to kill a calumniator even though the calumny or detraction could not be warded off by any other means. Nor is it allowed to kill a thief for a small amount of money, say one gold ducat, or to kill a man for the sake of a property right to be possessed only in future or by way of inheritance; or to kill one who retains an inheritance, etc.

     Provocation and actual aggression not infrequently overlap, and it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. A real challenge often amounts to great danger.

Commentary 2205 - Woywod

     Physical violence which robs a person of all freedom of action excludes all idea of crime.

     Grave fear, even relatively such, necessity and also great inconvenience, excuse as a rule from all guilt, if there is question of purely ecclesiastical laws.

     If, however, the act is intrinsically  evil, or involves contempt of faith or of ecclesiastical authority, or the harm of souls, the circumstances spoken of in the preceeding paragraph do indeed diminish the responsibility but do not take it away.

     The case of legitimate self-defense against an unjust aggressor, with due precaution not to injure the aggressor more than necessary for self-protection, excuses from all guilt; otherwise the responsibility is only diminished, as is the case also where provocation entices a person to do wrong. (Canon 2205)